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Abstract 
In this paper, I take up the question of “how fast does time flow?” This question is usually 
asked as a rejoinder to the view that time is irreducibly tensed, which is motivated by the 
fact that we experience the passage of time. I consider what the meaning of this question 
could be and provide a defence of the view that the passage of time is meaningless (due 
to its rate of passage being dimensionless), undercutting the motivation for a tensed view 
of time. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
“There are philosophers who think that some views about the nature of time 
can be refuted just by asking this question (in the right tone of voice). Others 
think the question has an obvious and boring answer” 
(Skow, 2011) 
 
Does time “pass” or “flow”? If so, how fast does it go? These questions are instances of 
a particularly difficult sort of philosophical question. Such questions’ meaning or 
significance is not initially clear. Naturally then, one may wonder whether the question 
has any meaning or significance at all. It may be that it is a mere misuse of language. 
However, this version of the questions at hand may be too abrupt. Our subjective 
experience gives us reason to believe that there is some truth to the statement that time 
flows (Maudlin 2007, Paul 2015 and 2010). This experience is often used as motivation 
for a so-called A-theory of time in which the present is somehow metaphysically 
privileged over the past and future. The present is defined, in part, by the fact that 
events flow from future to present and into the past.  
 
If one takes the expression of time’s flow to be more than metaphorical, as A-theorists 
tend to, then one would believe that the question of the speed of this flow would be well-
formed and answerable (as it is for other flows, like a river)3.This has provided the 
grounds for a modus-tollens argument against the A-theorist. Thus, the question is 
nonsensical, as the only plausible answer is meaningless, and so time cannot be said 
to flow at all. In this paper I will lay out expositions of the question’s possible meaning 
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and ultimately argue that it is indeed without meaning, providing a problem for the non-
metaphorical A-theorist. 
 
2 Establishing the Meaning of the Question 
 
In order to understand the meaning of the questions “Does time pass?” and “How fast?” 
we should first ascertain what it would mean to answer the first question in the 
affirmative. This is because the latter question only makes sense if the former does. 
Markosian (1998) provides a definition of what it means to affirm the passage of time. 
To say that time passes is to commit to the “passage thesis”: 
 
Passage Thesis: “Time is unlike the dimensions of space in at least this 
one respect: there are some properties possessed by time, but not 
possessed by any dimension of space, in virtue of which it is true to say 
that time passes.” (Markosian, 1998, 2) 
 
Markosian characterizes the passage of time as making time distinct from space (i.e. 
there are properties of time that are not possessed by any dimension of space). It is due 
to these properties that it is appropriate and true to say time passes and space does 
not. 
 
We can flesh out this characterisation in the following way. Asserting the passage thesis 
commits Markosian to two further theses, the first semantic, the second metaphysical: 
 
The Tensed Conception of Semantics: Propositions have truth-values at 
times and tenses (past, present, and future) that are ineliminable and 
fundamental (Markosian, 1998, 2). 
 
A-Property Thesis: Events have monadic tense properties (being present, 
being past, being future) that are not to be analyzed in terms of relational 
B-properties, they are properly basic. 
 
To provide a picture of what these two theses commits one to, consider an event, E. For 
example, the event of me submitting this paper for review. Say, at time t=0, that E has 
not yet occurred and will occur at t=1, then E would have the property of being future: 
Ft=0(E). At this time, proposition P, ‘E is occurring,’ is false (note the present tense of 
the verb occurring), while the proposition P*, ‘E will occur,’ is true (again, not the ‘will’). 
Then consider how this picture changes at time t=1, when I am submitting this paper. 
At t=1, E has the property of being present: Prt=1(E), P becomes true and P* becomes 
false. 
 
In sum: A present tensed proposition regarding some event is true at some time if and 
only if that event is present at that time and false otherwise. A past tensed proposition 
regarding some event is true at some time if and only if that event is past at that time 
and false otherwise. A future tensed proposition regarding some event is true at some 
time if and only if that event is future at that time and false otherwise4. 
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The third thesis that Markosian takes to be part of a commitment to the assertion that 
time passes is the pure passage of time thesis: 
 
Pure Passage of Time Thesis: Times and events inexorably have different 
A-properties successively, this is what the passage of time consists of 
(Markosian, 1998, 8-9). 
 
This is what gives time its flow; events future become events present and events present 
become events past. Prima facie, Markosian presents an intuitive correspondence theory 
of the passage of time: events successively change their tense properties and as such 
claims about them change their truth-value relative to the change in the events 
properties. It is not, however, the final word on the meaning of time’s passage. 
 
Van Cleve (2011) takes issue with Markosian’s (1998) exposition of the meaning of time’s 
passage and presents an alternative view from Prior. Prior sees the tensed conception of 
semantics as optional for the passage of time, and does not accept the A-property thesis 
(and further denies that the former implies the latter) (Van Cleve, 2011, 143). In Prior’s 
tense logic, tenses are substitutes for A-properties rather than mere semantic 
analogues. Rather than taking tenses to be properties attached to events, they are 
sentential operators, acting similarly to modal operators (i.e. tenses are adverbial rather 
than predicative) (ibid, 142-143). This avoids a commitment to events in the semantics; 
rather than needing actual events that have A-properties for a tensed statement about 
that event to be true, one can merely make a semantic claim about the truth-value of 
some sentence5. 
 
Van Cleve then presents Prior’s arguments that Markosian’s semantics is rooted in an 
assumed (and I think, mistaken) ontology. For Prior, there are no time “entities” (ibid, 
143); the Newtonian assumption that times exist independently of events in the world 
is unnecessary to the establishment of the meaning of times passage. Markosian makes 
a similar mistake with respect to time as Heidegger warned us against with respect to 
Being6; Time itself is not a being, it is a category mistake to assign 
properties, in this case A-properties, to it as if it is. Prior’s tense logic “lets us express 
truths about the topological structure of time without committing ourselves to Time as 
an entity” (Van Cleve, 2011, 7)7. 
 
So what, then, is a less ontologically presumptuous reading of the passage of time? The 
passage of time is, for Prior, the mere idea that truth values change in time. And so we 
get Markosian’s semantic claim, without the metaphysical baggage of times and events, 
nor a correspondence theory of tense. In response to the further question of the rate of 
time’s passage, Prior, perhaps facetiously, proffers the simple answer: a second per 
second (ibid, 163).  
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Now that we have some formulations of what it means to ask “Does time pass?” as well 
as a suggestive answer to the further question “How fast?” I shall move to a discussion 
of the meaning, or meaninglessness, and some answers to the latter question. 
 
3 The Incoherence of the Rate of Time’s Passage 
 
Assuming one has convinced an interlocutor that the passage of time is at least not 
initially nonsensical, the interlocutor may naturally push and ask: At what rate does it 
pass? The common analogy is between the “flow” of time and the “flow” of a river. 
Certainly a river flows at some definite, perhaps variable, non-zero rate, so too, must 
time, if the analogy is to hold. If there is no such coherent flow rate for time’s passage, 
then time cannot be said to truly pass at all. Markosian argues that the question of “how 
fast does time pass?” arises from these principles: 
 
Rate Principle: For any x, if x changes/passes, then it changes/passes at 
some rate. (A rate is a ratio between a parameter or metric of 
measurement and a unit of time.) (Markosian, 1998, 13) 
 
Coherence Principle: For any x, if some x flows or passes, then it is 
possible to state coherently the rate at which x flows or passes. 
(Markosian, 1998, 14) 
 
Markosian then lays out some possible strategies for measuring rates in order to show 
that in each case there is a way out of arguments against there being a rate of passage 
for time. I will use Van Cleve’s (2011, 11-12) distillation of these three possible 
strategies: (1) a rate may be measured by comparing to any other rate; (2) a rate of 
change can only be measured in comparison to the rate of the passage of time, either 
(2a) the pure passage of time can be measured in comparison with itself, or (2b) it makes 
no sense to assign a rate to the pure passage of time. 
 
A common objection to the pure passage of time thesis arises from accepting (2) but 
denying (2a) and (2b); the pure passage of time must be measured by another external 
time dimension. As the external time dimension (commonly called hyper-time) must also 
pass in reference to a higher time dimension, there is a threat of infinite regress to this 
strategy8. However, I want to set this argument aside. Markosian believes that his 
interlocutors have not shown that he should accept the premise that time’s rate of 
measure must be compared to an external (hyper)time dimension and so he denies it. I 
agree that there is no motivation for this premise; there are plenty of rates of change 
that have nothing to do with time (e.g. exchange rates, elevation rates), so why would 
time’s rate of change have an extra constraint on what it can be compared to? However, 
the A-theorist needs the flow of time to be a property unique to it and not shared with 
space. So then the question really is: what’s special about time? 
 
If we deny that the rate of time’s passage must be compared to an external (hyper)time 
dimension, we may then claim that the rate of passage of time can measured by 
comparing it to a “mundane” process (Van Cleve, 2011, 12); this is strategy (1). For 
example, the fact that that a person is running at a rate of 12 miles per hour can be 
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flipped into the fact that time is passing at a rate of one hour per 12 miles run by this 
same person. However this does not get us the direct measurement of the pure passage 
of time. What is an hour? It is a measure that is defined by some other mundane process 
(one 1/24th of the period of the sun’s rotation in the sky). In measuring rates, we are 
always comparing the changes of some phenomenon to the changes of some other 
phenomenon (e.g. distance travelled by a runner versus distance travelled by clock 
hands). Generally we do not actually care about the second phenomenon and use it as 
a stand in for direct comparison with the passage of time itself. To have this strategy 
effectively answer the question of the rate of time’s passage, one would need to postulate 
that some processes are more directly linked to the pure passage of time. What this 
privilege consists of needs to be supplied before this is anything more than conjecture. 
 
If one takes strategy (2a), there is an issue of units. How fast does time pass? At a rate 
of one second per second. Van Inwagen and I both share the complaint that this cannot 
be a meaningful rate, the units cancel and the number (unity) is dimensionless. Such 
dimensionless quantities are meaningless, to say that time passes at the rate of one 
second per second is to say that time passes at a rate of six (or fifty-two, whatever 
number fits your fancy). Six what? Any physics student has it beat into them that if you 
do not attach units to your number then it tells us nothing physical. Maudlin (2007) 
argues, that while this rate of time’s passage is indeed an a priori truth, it is not 
meaningless. He likens it to monetary exchange rates: 1 USD is worth 1 USD, but this 
is not vacuous. One must specify the units of the exchange, they do not, as it were, 
“cancel out.” He distinguishes ratios from numbers, the former retain their unit 
measures (like π as the ratio between a circle's diameter and circumference) while the 
later do not have such units (the real number π). Ratios have an associated class of 
units, length for π, in the circumference–diameter case. And so the rate of time's flow – 
one second per second – is not vacuous as it “is a measure of how much something 
changes per unit time.”  
 
I think Maudlin is bit quick in his rejection of this objection. While the units may not 
“cancel out” and do say something about the formal constraints on the passage of time 
(it must be self-consistent), he ignores how truly vacuous tautologies are. Maudlin’s 
constraint is merely that there be a use of the appropriate kind of units, both of these 
rates use solely temporal units. The former proposition, being a tautology at best, 
category mistake at worst, then does not tell us anything about the world. Nothing hangs 
on it, especially physically. A contrasting case will make this clearer. Consider the 
statement “a year passes every three hundred sixty-five days.” A way of putting this 
mathematically would be with a ratio: 
1 year
365 days
. The significance of such a ratio is 
linguistic, it allows us to translate values in terms of years into days and vice versa. One 
may object to this analysis. Don’t ‘year’ and ‘day’ correspond to aspects of physical 
reality? A year is the length of time it takes for the Earth to complete a revolution around 
the Sun and a day is the length of time it takes for the Earth to rotate about its own 
axis. Therefore this ratio is not merely linguistic, but rather has physical significance! 
 
There is a problem with this line of thought – or at least with these particular examples. 
Let’s focus on one of them. Due to astronomical effects like precession and tidal forces, 
what we call a year is not exactly the duration of the Earth’s solar rotation (the sidereal 
year). This is well-known and the reason we have leap-years every so often (to correct 
for the inaccuracies). Likewise with other measures (e.g. days). What does this show us? 
It shows us that a change in the units, the ratios and terms we associate with certain 
phenomena need not correspond to physical reality in a robust way. Put differently, we 
could use a different value for year, say 365.25 days per year, and this would be of no 
physical significance: it would be more accurate to the phenomenon of the Earth’s orbit, 
but it would not be more or less accurate in terms to the length of time itself (remember 
that days itself is a pragmatically chosen unit as well). Let’s return to the ratio of one  
second per second. This is a translation from the language of seconds to the language 
of seconds, a completely isomorphic transformation. As such, it is completely trivial and 
could not have any physical significance9. 
 
This takes us to the third strategy, (2b), which was suggested earlier by Prior, denying 
that it makes sense for the passage of time to have a rate. This can cut both ways, one 
can take this to show that there is a deeper incoherence in the notion of time passing 
as any passage should have a rate (as has been shown), or one can take it to show that 
the passage of time is a special sort of passage, one without any discernible rate. Van 
Cleve makes a distinction between absolute and comparative rates, the former being 
rates independent of any other rates and the latter being rates that are co-defining (e.g. 
monetary exchange rates). This distinction he gets from Newton’s own distinction 
between absolute and relative motion. Relative motion is simple to understand, it is the 
change of position of one body relative to the change of position of another body, over 
some period of time (e.g. two ships passing one another). Thus, there is not no sense in 
which a body’s relative motion can be defined without defining the relative motion of 
another body. Absolute motion, on the other hand, is the change of position of a body, 
over some period of time, irrespective of the motion of any other body10. For this to make 
sense, Newton needed a way to fix the initial and final positions of the body without 
reference to any other bodies, thus he introduced the concept of absolute space. This 
substratum gives each position in space a stable identity, allowing a change in position 
to be well-defined. Much like Newton, then, Van Cleve needs the postulation of some 
substratum that grounds the facts of absolute rates independent of any other 
comparative rates. Van Cleve suggests that we should again consider the pure passage 
of time to be this sort of absolute rate of change, leading us again to the tautological 
rate of one second per one second. He goes on to argue, that this does not even depend 
on the sort of substantivalist view expressed above and criticized by Prior. Indeed, he 
shows how Prior’s answer was a serious, and deflationary, response to the question 
“How fast does time pass?” 
 
Again, I wish to reiterate my concerns. Perhaps it is not nonsensical to say that time 
passes at a rate of one second per second, but it is also not saying anything at all. It is, 
perhaps, showing what it means for time to pass, that is, that one second precedes the 
next and the truth-value of certain tensed (metrically or otherwise) propositions changes 
with time. This however ignores why we wanted to establish the fact that time passes in 
the first place, it is supposed to be, as Skow puts it, metaphysically interesting. This is 
because it is supposed to motivate the dynamic theory of time against the attacks of the 
defenders of the static theory. So the A-theorist has a dilemma, which we started the 
paper with, they must establish their view on a nonsensical basis, a misuse of language, 
or say nothing at all. 
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4 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have attempted to make clear the meaning of the question: “How fast 
does time pass?” To do so, I first had to clarify what time’s passage may mean and what 
commitments come with its acceptance: either Markosian’s pure passage thesis or the 
deflated Priorian semantic thesis. I then delineate and respond to a number of possible 
strategies to answer the question coherently: (1) establishing the rate of time’s passage 
relative to the rates of other processes, (2) establishing the rate of time’s passage 
absolutely. The first strategy, I argue, fails by neglecting to establish what processes are 
to be reliable guides to the rate of time’s passage, and why. It also fails to explain why 
time’s passage is special, in a way the spatial rates of change are not. The second 
strategy, I argue, fails to establish anything physically or metaphysically interesting as 
the most promising candidate rate: one second per second is linguistically tautologous. 
The lack of any satisfying answer to the question: “How fast does time pass?” undercuts 
the motivation for a dynamic theory of time. The hope is that future motivations for 
dynamic theories of time are clearer and are clearly significant, providing a satisfactory 
answer to the question of how fast time passes. 
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